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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXPATRIATION-CRIMINAL DuE PROCESS As PREREQUISITE TO EXPATRIATION \,VHEN IMPOSED AS PUNISHMENT-Respondents,
native-born Americans, in two separate cases sought declaratory judgments confirming their status as United States citizens. One wanted to
return to this country, and the other sought to avoid deportation as an
alien. The Government claimed that respondents had lost their citizenship
by operation of section 401G) of the Nationality Act of 19401 and its successor, section 349(a)(IO) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,2
which automatically divest an American of his citizenship for "departing
from or remaining outside the jurisdiction of the United States in time
of war or . . . national emergency for the purpose of evading or avoiding
training and service" in the armed forces. Both respondents had remained
outside the United States during such a period, and one conceded that
his purpose in doing so was to avoid his military obligations. The statutory
provisions were held unconstitutional by the federal district courts.3 In
both cases direct appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, where the cases
were consolidated for decision. Held, affirmed, four Justices dissenting.
Congress cannot employ the sanction of expatriation as a punishment without providing for the procedural safeguards required by the fifth and sixth
amendments. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
The Constitution contains no express reference to expatriation, but,
beginning with an announcement in 1868 that "the right of expatriation
is a natural and inherent right of all people," 4 Congress has from time to
time enacted statutes specifying certain types of conduct which will result
in loss of citizenship.5 Uncertainty arose as to whether Congress was limited
to the mere enumeration of specific acts which clearly reveal a voluntary
abandonment or renunciation of citizenship, thereby simply giving substance to the individual's inherent right of self-expatriation,6 or whether
Congress's power extended to the effecting of an involuntary forfeiture of
citizenship where necessary to achieve a legitimate congressional objective.
This uncertainty was resolved by a five-to-four decision in Perez v.
Brownell,7 in which it was held that Congress could compel involuntary
forfeiture of citizenship for voting in a foreign political election.8 The
58 Stat. 746 (added in 1944).
66 Stat. 268, 8 U.S.C. § 148l(a) (10) (1958).
s Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp. 683 (D.D.C. 1960); Mendoza-Martinez v. Rogers, 192
F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
4 Act of July 27, 1868, REv. STAT. § 1999 (1875).
5 E.g., formal written renunciation of citizenship, naturalization in a foreign country,
a woman's marriage to a foreigner (since repealed), and serving in the armed forces of
a foreign country.
o No one questions the right to renounce voluntarily or abandon citizenship by
words or conduct. See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939); Perez v. Brownell,
356 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1958); id. at 66-67 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
7 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
8 The four dissenters in the principal case obviously agree with the Perez holding.
1
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power as it now exists is; however, subject to a number of limitations, the
most important of which are those of substantive due process. First, since
Congress may not act arbitrarily, there must be a "rational nexus" between
the use of the power of expatriation and the congressional objective sought
to be achieved.9 The means (expatriation) must be reasonably calculated
to achieve a legitimate congressional end and thereby designed to further
the ultimate objective.10 Secondly, it has been held that, even though the
legislative purpose is legitimate, that purpose cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle "fundamental personal liberties" when there are "less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."11 As the Court in the
principal case pointed out, American citizenship is a valuable right, and
its loss may result in "grave practical consequences." 12 Mr. Justice Brennan
in his concurring opinion referred to expatriation as a "terrifying remedy,''13 and the dissent characterized it a "drastic measure." 14 This would
suggest the appropriateness of limiting the use of involuntary expatriation
to situations where it provides a unique solution.11• A third limitation is
that expatriation, as is the case with any other legislative tool, must not,
under the circumstances, be unreasonable or excessive,16 that is, the congressional end sought must be of sufficient importance to justify the burden
imposed. Fourth, loss of citizenship may be imposed only as a consequence
of voluntary conduct,17 not as the result of coercion or duress. This limitation was expressly retained when the Perez decision was handed down,1s
and it seems to be a link with the past19 which suggests that the Court is
unwilling to· admit that the power to expatriate is unqualified.
Assuming that Mr. Justice Brennan, a member of the majority in both Perez and the
principal case, has not changed his mind, the principal case could be considered a reaffirmance of Perez. However, in this connection it is interesting to note that in the
principal case Mr. Justice Brennan mentions that he has some "doubts of the correctness of Perez." Principal case at 187. Add to this the fact that three of the dissenters
in Perez (the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Douglas) are still on the Court, and
one may well question the future of Perez. However, at the present time Perez stands.
9

Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958).

10 At present the only clues as to how clear this connection must be are in the

Perez
case (rational nexus with power to regulate foreign affairs existed because expatriation
for voting in foreign election prevented potential political embarrassment to our government), and in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (expatriation for military desertion
had no rational nexus with war power).
11 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); accord, Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v.
NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961).
12 Principal case at 160.
13 Id. at 187.
14 Id. at 214.
15 Mr. Justice Brennan would impose just such a "unique solution" limitation. See
principal case at 188.
16 Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 347-48 n.5 (1935); Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97,
107 (1877) (Bradley, J., concurring).
17 Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 133 (1958); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299,
311-12 (1915).
18 356 U.S. 44, 61 (1958).
19 In Perez the Court claimed to be following precedent, not making new law. One
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The basis for decision in the principal case-that expatriation when used
as a punishment cannot constitutionally be imposed except following a
criminal trial and conviction-now supplies an additional limitation on
congressional power. The determinative issue of the principal case was
whether Congress intended expatriation by means of section 4010) primarily as punishment. The majority felt that the legislative history was
conclusive evidence of a punitive purpose, while the dissent found the primary purpose to be the boosting of wartime morale by permanent exclusion
of unpatriotic persons and felt that this was a valid exercise of the war
power. The available legislative history of section 4010) is brief,20 and no
specific purpose is expressly stated therein. The majority also relied on
the purposes of similar statutes passed in 186521 and 1912,22 which the dissent challenged as being irrelevant, noting that section 4010) was "the
product of a totally different environment-the experience of a nation
engaged in a global war," 23 and implying that purposes behind identical
statutes may change with altered circumstances. At any rate, the legislative history seems to be weak evidence in relation to the judgment it must
support-a declaration of unconstitutionality.24
Aside from the relatively narrow issue of legislative history interpretation, this case is notable for the important constitutional issues that it
raises but does not decide.25 Assuming the requisite procedural due process
had been provided, would expatriation be within the powers of Congress
to apply as a criminal sanction? If Congress had expressed reasons other
than punitive for inflicting loss of nationality, would expatriation be within
the powers of Congress as part of a regulatory, as distinguished from a
prohibitory, scheme? The latter would be aimed at achieving a desired
result by proscribing a certain act, and the means employed would be a
criminal sanction, or "punishment," as a deterrent; whereas the former
would be aimed at achieving a desired result not by prohibiting the act
but by providing for an adjustment to neutralize the effect of the act if
it should occur. Such an "adjustment," although it may be a burden, is
not legally termed a "punishment." Of course regulation in its broader
sense would include certain ancillary prohibitions, but, since penal and
of the cases the Court relied on heavily was Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), in
which it was said that "a change of citizenship cannot be • • • imposed without the
concurrence of the citizen." Id. at 311. Thus, retention of the "voluntary conduct" doctrine was essential if the Court did not want to overrule Mackenzie.

20 See H.R. REP, No. 1229, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); S. REP. No. 1075, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1944); 90 CoNc. REc. 3256-63, 7628-29 (1944).
21 Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 490.
22 Act of August 22, 1912, ch. 336, 37 Stat. 356.
23 Principal case at 204.
24 This seeming willingness to accept equivocal evidence in the face of the "delicate
task" of constitutional adjudication might possibly be a symptom of a general dissatisfaction with the doctrine of involuntary expatriation coupled with an unwillingness to
face the expatriation issue squarely at the present time. See note 8 supra.
25 Principal case at 186 n.43.
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non-penal means are subject to different constitutional limitations, it is
desirable to treat them separately. If expatriation is used as part of a
regulatory scheme, the "rational nexus" requirement_ would seem to limit
its use to facilitation of only two congressional powers-the war power or
the power to regulate foreign affairs. The Perez case is an example of the
utilization of the device of expatriation as part of a regulatory scheme.
Although in the regulatory scheme context the procedural requirements of
the sixth amendment are inapplicable, the procedure provided for the
protection of individual rights must still comply with the fifth amendment's
requirement of due process. The fifth amendment guarantees no particular
form of procedure,26 and procedural due process was not discussed in the
Perez case. Of course the procedure provided in that case must have been
sufficient since loss of nationality was upheld. The procedural statute there
involved27 provided for a suit for a declaration of nationality in a district
court by anyone denied a right or privilege of citizenship by a government agency. This statute has since been replaced by another28 which differs somewhat in terms. But under recent Supreme Court interpretation,20
the type of relief available under the Perez statute is still available, and
thus there should be no procedural due process problem when expatriation
is used as part of a regulatory scheme.30
Whether or not Congress can employ expatriation as punishment would
appear to be an open question. As is suggested in the principal case, expatriation and banishment (the practical result of expatriation in many
cases) have throughout history been used as punishment.31 In 1800 the
Court held that "the right to . . . banish, in the case of an offending
citizen, must belong to every govemment." 32 In the principal case the
question was expressly avoided by the majority,33 and simply not considered by the dissent. The question has been before the Court only once.
In Trop v. Dulles,34 decided on the same day as Perez, the Court in a fiveto-four decision denied resort to expatriation when used as punishment
for desertion from the armed forces. Four Justices, three of whom are still
on the bench (Warren, Black and Douglas), felt that expatriation as punishment is "cruel and unusual" per se, and thus a violation of the eighth
amendment. Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in a separate opinion, impliedly rejecting the "cruel and unusual" per se doctrine. The dissent, in
which Justices Harlan and Clark joined, also rejected the "cruel and unusual" per se doctrine, pointing out that, since the death penalty could
NLRB v. :Mackay Radio &: Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351 (1938).
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 503, 54 Stat. 1171.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 360, 66 Stat. 273, 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1958).
Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962).
A future congressional attempt to limit this scope of relief might raise constitu•
tional problems. See Rusk v. Cort, supra note 29, at 380-82 (Brennan, J., concurring).
31 Principal case at 168 n. 23.
32 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 20 (1800) (opinion of Cushing, J.).
33 Principal case at 186 n.43.
34 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
26
27
28
29
30
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have been imposed for desertion, expatriation was not "cruel and unusual."
Thus, at the present time there are three Justices who would call expatriation employed as punishment a per se violation of the eighth amendment,
three Justices who would not condemn it as such out of hand, and three
Justices who have yet to be heard from. Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion in Trop laid down a requirement that the penalty must be "rationally directed to achieve the legitimate ends of punishment," 35 and
concluded that this requirement had not been met.
The ends of punishment toward which expatriation might conceivably
be directed are deterrence, insulation of society from dangerous individuals,
and retribution. Here one peculiar characteristic of expatriation should
be noted. Its effects and full ramifications cannot be known in advance.
The expatriate may become stateless, a situation the consequences of
which may be very harsh and which in any event cannot be accurately
predicted. Or he may be a dual national, thereby still retaining the citizenship of another country to which he might be perfectly happy to retreat. Or, even if stateless, he might later acquire the citizenship of a
friendly country. And if expatriation is not coupled with deportation he
may remain in the United States and continue to enjoy most of the benefits of citizenship. The point is that it is difficult to determine whether
the penalty is "rationally directed to achieve the legitimate ends of punishment" when it is not known what results the penalty in question will
achieve. 36 Its deterrent effect is most difficult to predict, and the amount
of retribution may range from slight inconveniences to a forced life of
wandering as a stateless individual. And only a small part of society (the
expatriating country) could be insulated from the individual. Even if
these ends of punishment are to some degree achieved by expatriation, it
is only in a most haphazard fashion. It seems difficult to say that such an
inefficient method is "rational."37 Another argument might be made in
opposition to the imposition of expatriation as punishment. Even assuming that expatriation might achieve the ends of punishment, are there not
"less drastic means" available, such as fines and imprisonment, to accomplish the same ends? It seems that the traditional modes of punishment
can achieve equally well, if not better, any of the ends of punishment to
which expatriation might be directed. If one is willing to concede that
these traditional modes are "less drastic" than expatriation, the chances of
expatriation being constitutionally imposed as punishment disappear. It
should be noted that, outside of the provisions struck down in the prin35 Id. at 111. This of course is simply the "rational nexus" test applied specifically
to Congress's power to set penalties for violations of federal law. See note 9 supra and
accompanying text.
36 "[I]t must be questioned whether expatriation can really achieve the • . . effects
sought by society in punitive devices." Trop v. Dulles, &56 U.S. 86, 111-12 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring).
37 Availability of more efficient and less objectionable alternative methods was one
of the reasons for Mr. Justice Brennan's concurrence in Trop v. Dulles, supra note 36,
at 114.
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cipal case and in Trop, there are no other statutory provisions relating to
expatriation which evince a primary purpose of punishment.3 B
It seems settled that Congress has the power, at least for some purposes,
to effect involuntary expatriation. However, that power is fenced in by
many limitations. The requirement that "less drastic means" be used if
available will probably limit its use to situations wherein it is a unique
solution. The uncertainty of the effects of expatriation on an individual
and the availability of more efficient alternatives would suggest the inappropriateness of its use as a punishment.
John W. Erickson

38 See § 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 267-68, as
amended, 68 Stat. 1146 (1954), 8 U.S.C. § 148l(a) (1958). Section 349(a)(9) provides for
expatriation upon conviction for treason or upon conviction for conspiracy to overthrow the government by force. This may appear to be punishment, but it can easily
be construed to show lack of allegiance and thus be considered a voluntary abandonment
of citizenship. See Note, 44 CoRNELL L.Q. 593, 598-99 (1959).

